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1. INTRODUCTION
The independent agencies of the United States government
operate with a finite amount of resources and funding.' Congress
allocates funds based on calculations of economics, domestic and
foreign policies, and politics.' Just as Congress must make spend-
ing choices, independent federal agencies must make choices on
how to spend the funds they are allocated. Facing the yearly
prospect of a limited budget, administrative agencies exercise dis-
cretion in spending their allocation of funds while carrying out
their assigned functions.3
Agencies use two methods in their attempt to achieve efficient
spending: rulemaking and discretionary enforcement. Rulemak-
ing is often used as a means of preventing future conduct that
would be violative of a statute. Rules are promulgated by admin-
istrative agencies pursuant to authority provided in the relevant
statute. Agencies, through rulemaking, thereby can avoid bring-
ing many future enforcement actions in response to such activities
* J.D. candidate, 2000, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1997,
Stanford University. I would like to thank the staff attorneys in the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Division of Enforcement for introducing me to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In addition, I would like to thank Ellen
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I See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, ECONOMICS 971 (1995) ("In the past two dec-
ades government spending increased more than taxes in the United States ....
As a result, budget deficits and government borrowing rose sharply.").
2 See id. at 972.
1 See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 773 (2d ed. 1994); see also ALAN STONE, ECONOMIC REGULATION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 66-73 (1977); Mary Claire Mahaney & Adrian E. Tschoegl, The
Determinants of FTCAntitrust Activity, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1983); Richard A.
Posner, The Behavior ofAdministrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305 (1972).
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because clear rules notify the public of what activities are prohib-
ited under specific statutory provisions. Rulemaking thus allows
the agency to spend the funds that it would have spent on exces-
sive enforcement actions in a more efficient manner.4 Adminis-
trative agencies also achieve efficient spending through the use of
discretionary enforcement. Agencies pursue enforcement actions
in situations that offer the greatest deterrence for the cost- a
practice deemed permissible by the United States Supreme
Court.5 Assuming equal costs, agencies will choose to enforce
their regulations in cases where there is a high deterrent value."
As enforcement costs vary, administrative agencies must analyze
deterrence in light of these costs and choose courses of action
which minimize costs and maximize deterrence.
Rulemaking and discretionary enforcement help agencies ad-
here to the doctrine of internal control.7 The doctrine of internal
control mandates that "each spending agency has primary respon-
sibility for ensuring that resources are used properly and effi-
ciently."8 The United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC") is a "spending agency." It regulates the U.S.
securities markets and its enforcement decisions are governed by
the doctrine of internal control. SEC decisions concerning the
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") ex-
emplify adherence to the doctrine of internal control.
The FCPA prohibits issuers and domestic concerns from brib-
ing foreign officials in efforts to further their business interests
I See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 296 (4th ed. 1997) ("[T]he rulemaking process
can be more efficient than case-by-case adjudication, because it can resolve a
multiplicity of issues in a single proceeding.").
' See Moog Indus., Inc. v. F.T.C., 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958) ("[T]he Com-
mission alone is empowered to develop that enforcement policy best calculated
to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its available funds
and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and economi-
cally.").
6 A high deterrent value exists in situations where the enforcement action
is visible and the remedies are substantial. In such situations, the agency can
expect others under its regulatory supervision to be deterred from similar activ-
ity.
7 See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS
183 (1995) ('Financial management in the federal government is guided by the
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abroad Section 78dd-110 issuers are those entities whose securi-
ties are registered under section twelve of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") or who must file reports under section
15(d) of the 1934 Act." Domestic concerns are individuals, who
are U.S. citizens, nationals, or residents, and entities, which have
principal places of business in the United States or which are or-
ganized under the laws of a state or territory of the United States
and do not qualify as issuers under section 30A of the 1934 Act.
12
The prohibitions in sections 30A and 78dd-2 are substantially the
same and their differences lie only in whom they target and who
enforces them.
Section 30A permits the SEC to pursue civil enforcement ac-
tions since the SEC has jurisdiction over the involved issuers.
The SEC does not have jurisdiction over domestic concerns tar-
geted by section 78dd-2. Accordingly, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") is responsible for section 78dd-2 civil and criminal en-
forcement actions, as indicated by the statute. 3 For the purposes
of this Comment, only section 30A is relevant because SEC
FCPA enforcement actions for bribery of foreign officials arise
under this section.
Enforcement of the FCPA is the responsibility of both the
SEC and the DOJ. The SEC, whose jurisdiction includes only
civil matters, enforces the civil aspects of the FCPA, while the
" See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78m
(Law. Co-op. 1999) (amending 15 U.S.C. % 78dd-1, 78dd-2, and 78m (1998)).
Section 78dd-1 ("section 30A") concerns "[p]rohibited foreign trade practices by
issuers," while section 78dd-2 addresses "[p]rohibited foreign trade practices by
domestic concerns," which do not qualify as issuers. Id. % 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (em-
phasis added). Section 78m concerns the filing of periodical and other reports
b y issuers. These must be based on "books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the issuer." 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m(b)(2)(A). This section's role in
the prevention of foreign corrupt practices is to require issuers to state the pur-
pose of all payments. In order to avoid liability, an issuer would have to report
a bribe to a foreign official as "a bribe to a foreign official." 15 U.S.C.S. §
78m b)(2)(A). The requirements of this section fall within SEC jurisdiction,
but they do not address the actual act of bribery. Section 78m, therefore, is not
a focus of this Comment.
10 This section amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and exists as
30A.
1 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1; see also Dooley v. United Technologies Corp.,
803 F. Supp. 428, 438-40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (delineating further to whom the
FCPA applies).
12 See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)-(B) (defining domestic concern).
13 See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd-2(g)(1)(B).
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DOJ is responsible for criminal enforcement. As many commen-
tators have observed, the DOJ tends to enforce the bribery provi-
sions of the FCPA,14 while the SEC enforces the record-keeping
provisions." The SEC, during a civil investigation, may recom-
mend that the DOJ institute a criminal investigation. Such an in-
vestigation could lead the DOJ to seek attorney liability for ad-
vice given. Again, the FCPA does not provide for such liability,
but when applied as a criminal statute, criminal conspiracy and
aiding and abetting laws might, as with criminal bribery of public
officials, be available to prosecutors. This Comment, however,
only addresses the issue of the civil liability of attorneys during an
SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning bribery.
A statutory prohibition against the bribery of U.S. public of-
ficials, similar in several ways to the FCPA, merits a brief analysis
for the purpose of better understanding the elements of section
30A. That statute prohibits persons from "directly or indirectly,
corruptly" giving, offering, or promising "anything of value to
any public official or person who has been selected to be a public
official ... with [the] intent to influence any official act," to in-
fluence the receiving party to participate in fraud, or to "do or
omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official
or person."16 The section also prohibits public officials from de-
manding anything of value in return for any of the above-
mentioned activities."' According to the statute, a public official
may be a "Member of Congress... an officer or employee or per-
son acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any depart-
ment, agency or branch of Government thereof ." 18 Many of the
abuses of government targeted by section 201 are also the subject
of section 30A.
Section 201 appears, in several ways, to be quite similar to the
FCPA. Both statutes not only prohibit giving anything of value,
14 See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd-2 (Law. Co-op. 1999).
" See, e.g., Rachel Witmer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: House Panel Clears
Bill to Strengthen Anti-Bribery Laws Under New Treaty, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
1353 (1998) ("The commissioner actively enforces the books and records and
internal controls provisions of the statute."); see also supra text accompanying
note 9 (detailing the 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m provisions).
16 18 U.S.C. S 201(b)(1) (1994).
17 See id. §j 201 (b) (2).
11 Id. § 201(a)().
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but also prohibit offers and promises to give such items.1 9 Provi-
sions exist in each statute which are designed to attach liability to
direct and indirect transfers of things of value.2' Thus, both stat-
utes recognize that third-party conduits could be used in attempts
to mask any identifiable quid pro quo between the giving and re-
ceiving ?arties. Finally, both statutes contain the adverb, "cor-
ruptly". However, this similarity only exists at first glance.
An important distinction must be drawn between the two
uses of "corruptly." The FCPA requires that an issuer not use an
"instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance
of an offer, payment, or promise to pay" a foreign official.' The
state of mind required under the FCPA differs between sections
30A(a)(1)-(2) and 30A(a)(3). Under the first two subsections,
recklessness or even serial negligence might satisfy the require-
ment. Thus, the act of giving, offering, or promising under sec-
tion 30A(a)(1)-(2) would be considered a corrupt action, and cor-
rupt intent or knowledge would not be required. By contrast,
section 30A(a)(3) requires at least the knowledge that one's actions
are corrupt.
Section 201's use of "corruptly" seems to require the same
knowledge or intent as section 30A(a)(3).24 As a result, the finding
of liability under the bribery statute involves proving a more
heightened state of mind2 than does the finding of liability under
section 30A(a)(1)-(2). In addition, the fact that bribery of public
officials carries criminal liability,26 while a SEC FCPA enforce-
ment action seeks civil liability,' indicates that the DOJ must sat-
isfy a higher standard of proof under section 201 than the SEC
must under section 30A. The former must prove guilt beyond a
19 Compare FCPA S 30A(a), 15 U.S.C.S. 5 78dd-1 (Law. Co-op. 1999),with
18 U.S.C. S 201(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1(a) (Supp. 1999).
2 See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978) (defining
the requisite corrupt intent under § 201);see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (Law Co-
op. 1999) (using "intent" as part of the statutory language).
2' Intent constitutes a more heightened state of mind than knowledge or
recklessness (or serial negligence). See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
26 Title 18 of the United States Code enumerates federal criminal offenses.
2 SEC enforcement is limited to civil actions.
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reasonable doubt whereas the latter need only make a showing of
liability by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, it ap-
pears that, on the whole, the SEC would have an easier time prov-
ing FCPA liability than the DOJ would proving guilt of criminal
bribery. These observations support the reason 28 why the SEC
does not find attorneys liable for advice under the FCPA, while
the DOJ will find them liable under the criminal bribery statute.
Attorney liability is not addressed by section 30A. The stat-
ute clearly enumerates those who may be found liable under its
provisions: unless an attorney is an issuer, officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent of an issuer or a stockholder acting on behalf of
an issuer, the attorney cannot be found liable.29 It is conceivable
that an attorney, acting as an issuer's agent, could use interstate
commerce to offer something of value to a foreign official or po-
litical party. In this situation, however, the attorney would be li-
able for giving the item of value, not for giving legal advice.
Case law concerning the FCPA has only begun to emerge
over the past decade. During the first ten years of the Act's exis-
tence, most SEC FCPA enforcement actions were settled prior to
administrative or district court adjudication." Certain FCPA-
related cases that serve to define the FCPA's purpose, its ele-
ments, and its application, however, have been litigated.31
The liabilities of attorneys and accountants, under the U.S. se-
curities laws, are addressed in U.S. case law.32 It should be noted
28 See infra Section 2.
29 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1 (Law. Co-op. 1999).
30 See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND
REMEDIES § 12.06[1] (1988).
31 See, e.g., Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992)
(establishing that while the FCPA does not apply to foreign corporations
which are not issuers registered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. S 78q), it does apply to
foreign individuals acting as agents for domestic concerns or issuers, whether or
not the individual was in the United States, as long as the federal courts other-
wise have jurisdiction over the person); United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308
(8th Cir. 1991) (applying the criminal provisions of the FCPA); United States v.McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employee may not be
found liable of FCPA bribery unless his employer is first found liable of the
same violation); SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,149 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (concerning the first
litigated violation of the FCPA's accounting requirements). These cases address
different issues surrounding the FCPA, but do not treat attorney liability under
the Act.
32 See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991) (concerning
when attorneys could be held liable to third parties for misrepresentations in
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that instances of professional persons' liability are most often re-
lated to section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 violations, in which a viola-
tion of section 78m could be included, but not a section 30A brib-
ery violation. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations concern the
use of "any manipulative or deceptive device.., in contravention
of... " SEC rules designed to protect the investing public.33 Ac-
cordingly, misstatements or omissions in the section 78m required
disclosure of asset dispositions might violate section 10(b) and its
accompanying rule. The act of bribery, however, as opposed to
its omission in financial statements, does not constitute deception
of the investing public and, therefore, would be less likely to be
actionable under section 10(b).
The SEC may, nevertheless, have authority, through means
other than section 10(b), to bring actions against attorneys whose
advice leads issuers to violate the FCPA's bribery provisions.
This authority is not made explicit by the FCPA, but might be
implied by section 20 of the 1934 Act34 or SEC Rule 102(e).3
The SEC, however, does not bring such actions,36 choosing in-
stead to follow a more economically efficient and effective course
of regulation- it defers to private actions, thereby preserving its
limited enforcement resources. This Comment seeks to identify
the enforcement benefits that the SEC gains through its deference
to the private sector. These benefits result from the SEC's ability
to use its limited resources in areas other than attorney enforce-
ment actions while maintaining a regulatory scheme via the very
entities under its FCPA jurisdiction.
Section 2 of this Comment explains the legislative effort that
created the FCPA. Section 3 offers a history of the SEC's applica-
tion of the FCPA. Section 4 discusses remedies under the FCPA.
violation of section 10(b)); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111 (2d
Cir. 1982) (addressing accountant liability for fraud in violation of section
10(b)).
11 15 U.S.C.S. S 78j(b) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (prohibiting the use of manipu-
lative and deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties).
14 See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78t (1994) (providing for the liability of controlling
persons).
" See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1995) (replacing the material identical to Rule
2(e) and providing for the suspension or debarment of persons who have vio-
lated, or aided a violation of federal securities laws).
" This is evidenced by the dearth of case law and SEC administrative hear-
ings concerning attorney liability under the FCPA.
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Section 5 sets forth the economic argument concerning the bene-
fits the SEC gains by deferring to the private sector. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 identifies recent international developments concerning the
bribery of foreign public officials. This discussion seeks to ana-
lyze the new international bribery convention, to comment on
resistance it may face, and to explain U.S. efforts to comply with
the agreement. Section 6 also offers insight as to how the new
convention will affect the SEC and its regulation of attorneys.
2. CREATION OF THE FCPA
A brief overview of section 30A's structure follows. As al-
ready stated, section 30A targets issuers, a category which includes
officers, directors, employees, and agents of the issuer, as well as
stockholders "acting on behalf of such issuer." 37 The statute pro-
hibits issuers from using the mails or other forms of interstate
commerce "corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, prom-
ise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or of-
fer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of any-
thing of value to" foreign officials, foreign political parties, or
persons whom it is known will transfer such things of value to
foreign officials or political parties." The statute indicates that
the prohibited activity must be specifically intended to influence
foreign officials or political parties in their official decision-
making process, to induce them into violating their lawful duties,
or to induce them into exercising their influence over their re-
spective government's acts or decisions.39
Section 30A also provides an exception for routine govern-
mental actions (grease payments), enumerates affirmative defenses,
and explains the process whereby an issuer may seek the opinion
of the Attorney General concerning the DOJ's policy on issuers'
conformance with the statute.' Such opinions, however, are non-
binding on the DOJ and an issuer may still be found liable under
the FCPA despite an opinion by the Attorney General favorable
to the issuer.41
17 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1(a) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 See id. § 78dd-l(b)-(e).
41 In court, opinions of the Attorney General provide an issuer with only a
rebuttable presumption that the conduct for which an opinion was given con-
forms with DOJ enforcement policies and that no violation occurred. See 15
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The state of mind required for an issuer to be found liable is
not uniform throughout section 78dd-1. Although "knowledge"
appears as a requirement in subsection (a)(3), statutory construc-
tion indicates that lesser standards may be applicable to (a)(1)-(2),
which does not mention a scienter requirement.42 This suggests
that Congress, which purposely chose to include "knowing" in
the third subsection, similarly chose not to limit the requirement
to "knowing" in the first two subsections. There is no reason to
assume that "knowing" should apply to the two subsections pre-
ceding the element's introduction as these subsections "contain[]
no words indicating that Congress intended to impose a 'scienter'
requirement." 4" Thus, in the absence of an enumerated scienter
requirement, one might choose to adopt more lenient standards
such as "recklessness" or "gross negligence." Adopting a standard
of serial negligence that applies to continuing acts that are negli-
gent in nature might also be an option.
Whatever scienter requirement the courts apply, it makes
sense for the standard to be less strict than those found in section
30A(a)(3). The first two subsections concern offers, payments,
gifts, etc., made directly to foreign officials, political parties, and
candidates, while the third subsection concerns offers, payments,
etc., made to persons not in a position to personally approve
business opportunities." Instead, these persons initially receiving
payments or offers must directly or indirectly act as a conduit for
these offers, funds, or gifts to reach those in decision-making posi-
tions.4" Owing to the more attenuated route taken in the latter
scenario, there exists a greater need to confirm that the issuer was
not only targeting the initial recipient, but also that the issuer de-
sired a direct or indirect transfer to a foreign official, political
party, etc. A "knowing" element helps to confirm that the intent
behind the issuer's action was to influence decision-makers within
government. On the other hand, offers, payments, gifts, etc.,
U.S.C.S. S 78dd-1(e)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1999); 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd-l(e)(4) (Law. Co-
op. 1999) (providing "timely guidance concerning the Department of Justice's
present enforcement policy").
42 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1(a).
41 Exchange Act Release No. 34-15570, 16 S.E.C. Docket 1143, 1151 (1979)
(concerning the fact that no scienter requirement was inserted in SEC Rule
13b2-1 because Congress had not placed such a requirement in § 13(b) of the
Exchange Act).
44 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-1(a)(3).
45 See id.
1999)
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made directly to persons or parties in positions of governmental
control, do not require the same strict standard. The issuer's tar-
get, in this case, is obvious, which makes it easier to infer the in-
tent behind such an action since there is a direct payment or offer
to the persons or parties in positions of governmental control.
This direct payment or offer eliminates the necessity of evaluating
possible reasons behind an offer or payment to an intermediary.
2.1. Impetus
Congress passed the FCPA as Public Law 95-213 in 1977. It
was one of several efforts to curb corrupt practices which became
an issue of U.S. policy following the Watergate investigation and
prosecutions. Both Congress and the SEC uncovered evidence of
foreign bribery by SEC-registered corporations as well as other
domestic entities. The SEC investigation "revealed corrupt for-
eign payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of
millions of dollars."46 These payments were perceived to be inju-
rious to the United States' interests.47 Congress designed the
FCPA as "[a] strong anti-bribery law [that was] urgently needed
to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public
confidence in the integrity of the American business system."4"
The Act seeks to "make clear that cessation of [foreign bribery] is
a matter, not merely of SEC concern, but of national policy."'49
Congress, in drafting the FCPA, also sought to minimize the fed-
eral government's enforcement burden."0 Thus, the FCPA can be
seen as a means of controlling foreign bribery while at the same
time requiring only limited oversight by the SEC and the DOJ.
2.2. Legislative History
The FCPA's legislative history contains three central reports
which, if read in sequence, indicate the path that Congress took in
46 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1784.
4' See id. at 34 (suggesting that these payments had negative effects on U.S.
foreign policy, on "[c]onfidence in the financial integrity of [U.S.] corpora-
tions," and on "[t]he efficient functioning of [U.S.] capital markets").
41 Id. at 4.
41 Id. at 10.
50 See id. at 10 ("Direct criminalization entails... less of an enforcement
burden on the Government. The criminalization of foreign corporate bribery
will to a significant extent act as a self-enforcing, preventative mechanism.").
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reaching consensus on Public Law 95-213."i Addressing enforce-
ment responsibilities, the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs justified SEC jurisdiction over section 30A
violations as a means of preventing the DOJ from having to "du-
plicate the investigative capability already in the SEC at a greater
cost to the Government." 2 Although the Committee recognized
that the SEC can only bring an injunctive action," it determined
that this limited remedy was a more efficient means of achieving
regulation. The Committee noted that "[it is often difficult to
assemble the degree of evidence required in a criminal action, but
enough evidence may exist to enable the SEC to halt a continua-
tion of the corrupt practices through an injunctive action." 4 The
Report suggests that the FCPA does provide for attorney liability,
but it does not specify which portion of the Act must be violated
in order to attach such liability. Yet, despite this authorization,
the'SEC has not pursued such proceedings in the context of sec-
tion 30A violations.5
House Report 95-640 also indicates the desire for "a strong
anti-bribery statute" that "would actually help U.S. corporations
resist corrupt demands."5 6 The House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce expressed its support for a broad prohibi-
tion in House Report 95-640.sz A broad prohibition, it should be
noted, would make for somewhat easier enforcement since nei-
ther the SEC nor the DOJ would be forced to pursue narrowly
defined conduct. The two law enforcement agencies could exer-
cise greater investigative and prosecutorial discretion and choose a
variety of types of violations which would function as examples
of prohibited conduct. Such discretion would aid the SEC in its
regulatory mission since the agency, operating on a limited
budget, could maximize the effects of its enforcement actions.
Even without a broad prohibition, the SEC could expect com-
" See S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1784 (ac-
companying S. 305, the bill to amend the 1934 Act through the addition of ac-
counting and bribery provisions); H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120 (accompanying I.R. 3815); andH.R. REP. No. 95-
831, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120 (also accompanying S. 305).
52 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1784.
53 See id.
11 Id. at 12.
" See supra text accompanying note 36.
56 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120.
17 See id. at 7.
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paratively less difficulty with enforcement actions than the DOJ
since it need only satisfy civil standards of proof instead of the
criminal standards that the DOJ must satisfy.
House Report 95-640 also shows Congressional desire to
"strengthen the Commission's ability to enforce compliance with
the existing requirements of the securities laws." 8 The Commit-
tee's suggestion that no proof of scienter be required in an SEC
FCPA action (or any other SEC enforcement action) further indi-
cates the ease of enforcement sought for the SEC. 9 Finally, the
minority position within the Committee expressed concern over
limited SEC resources and advanced this concern as a reason for
not giving the SEC bribery jurisdiction. 6' This concern, however,
could explain why the SEC does not seek to impose attorney li-
ability for advice that leads to an instance of bribery in FCPA ac-
tions.
House Report 95-831 illustrates how the Senate and House
compromised to achieve the House amendment contained in
House Report 95-640. Although this report contains the FCPA
as it was enacted two weeks after the report's printing, House Re-
port 95-831 does not shed additional light on the issue of attorney
liability.
61
3. SEC APPLICATION OF THE FCPA
The SEC announced an FCPA policy statement in 1980, de-
claring that "the Commission, as a matter of prosecutorial discre-
tion" would not bring an enforcement action under the FCPA's
bribery provision if the DOJ assured the alleged violator that it
would not bring criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, during the
58 Id. at 9.
5 See id. at 10. This, however, must be seen only as a desire during the leg-
islative process. Since 1976, it has been established that proof of scienter is re-
quired in many SEC enforcement actions. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976). In addition, 1988 Amendments to the FCPA appeared to
mandate a higher standard than the 1977 committee envisioned. See Pub. L.
No. 05-366 (1988).
60 See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 20 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4120.
61 For additional information on the FCPA's legislative history, see the
CONG. REC. 123 (1977): May 5 (considered and passed Senate); Nov. 1 (consid-
ered and passed House, amended); Dec. 6 (Senate agrees to conference report);
and Dec. 7 (House agrees to conference report).
62 Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-
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first eleven years of the FCPA's existence, the SEC initiated in-
junctive actions and administrative proceedings under the Act.
Until 1983, all these actions were settled through the consent pro-
cess. 63 In 1983, the first litigated FCPA case was judicially de-
cided.64 The SEC's FCPA litigation and settlement through the
consent process continued steadily until the late 1980s, 6 after
which began a drought in FCPA enforcement actions.66
The absence of FCPA enforcement actions lasted until 1997.67
Recently, two SEC officials indicated the likelihood of increased
FCPA enforcement. 68 These forecasts, made in mid-1997, appear
to be fairly accurate. An international effort in 1997 and 1998 led
to a Convention designed to implement FCPA-like prohibi-
18,255 (Nov. 12, 1981) (confirming SEC policy as established in SEC Release
No. 34-17,099 (1980)).
63 See, e.g., SEC v. Hermetite Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 9756 (Sept.
15, 1982); SEC v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 9437
(Sept. 2, 1981); SEC v. Sfisco, 15 SEC Litigation Release No. 8483 (July 28,
1978); see also STEINBERG, supra note 30, at 12-19.
' See SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., SEC Litigation Release
No. 9955 (Apr. 7, 1983).
6' See, e.g., SEC v. Conway, SEC Litigation Release No. 11,339 (Jan. 22,
1987); SEC v. Ashland Oil, SEC Litigation Release No. 11,150 (July 8, 1986).
66 See DOING BUSINESs IN THE US S 33.05 (1998). Perhaps the disappear-
ance of FCPA enforcement actions in the late 1980s was due to a shift in the
focus of enforcement efforts. Following the investigations and prosecutions of
the Milken-Boesky-Siegel-Levine insider-trading ring, the 1987 stock market
crash, the release of Wall Street (movie), and the publishing of JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991), SEC staff attorneys might have chosen to
focus their efforts on these higher profile violations.
67 See Richard McAdoo Consents to Permanent Injunction Under the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC News Digest, 1997 SEC News LEXIS 1380
(1997); SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 15,266 (Feb.
27, 1997).
68 See SEC Enforcement: McLucas Predicts More FCPA Cases, 29 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 310 (1997) (reporting on then-Director of Enforcement McLu-
cas' statement that corporate "[c]onduct 'is reminiscent' of the early 1970s,"
and that "'[c]orporate America has gotten a little loose' about compliance with
the [FCPA]"); see also SEC Enforcement: SEC Official Predicts More FCPA
Cases in Near Future, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 607 (1997) (reporting on Direc-
tor of the SEC's Midwest Regional Office Mary Keefe's description of SEC v.
Triton as a "'message case' that was intended to 'underscore the responsibilities
of corporate management in the area of foreign payments,'" and the Director's
opinion that "the 'number of emerging markets in which American companies
are trying to gain footholds may be a factor in the increased number of investi-
gations the commission's enforcement staff has [regarding] questionable foreign
payments by public companies.'").
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tions.69 Federal legislation resulting from this agreement amended
the FCPA and gave the SEC increased enforcement abilities and
targets.7" The Commission quickly should realize greater en-
forcement opportunities, as the decade-long "pattern of sporadic
enforcement is about to change.""1 These new opportunities will
result from increased international transactions and the expanded
SEC jurisdiction conferred by the amendment.72
4. FCPA REMEDIES
The FCPA, as passed in 1977, did not enumerate any specific
remedies available to the SEC in enforcing the Act. However, the
1999 amendment to section 78dd-2 included provisions allowing
injunctive relief, other civil penalties, and criminal fines and im-
prisonment terms which are available in DOJ actions.73 The pen-
alties available to the SEC were the injunctive and equitable
remedies already granted by section 21 of the 1934 Act. 4 Under
this section, the monetary penalties allowed are divided into three
tiers.7 5  FCPA violations would fall within the last two.7 6  The
second tier requires violations involving "fraud, deceit, manipula-
tion, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory require-
ment." 7' Tier three penalties mandate the same violation ele-
ments as those in tier two, plus also require that the violation
cause substantial losses or the risk of such losses.78 Compared to
tier two, tier three penalties allow the Commission to assess
greater damages.
69 See infra Section 5.1.
0 See infra Section 5.1.2.
71 DOING BUSINESS IN THE US, supra note 66, S 33.05; see infra Section
5.1.2 (discussing increased press coverage of possible FCPA-violative activities).
72 See infra Section 5.1.2.
73 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(d) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (indicating situations in
which the Attorney General may seek injunctions and temporary restraining
orders against domestic concerns as well as situations in which violations o
subpoenas may be deemed contempt of court); 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd-2(g) (Law.
Co-op. 1999) (establishing the civil and criminal penalties that may be imposed
on domestic concerns, their officers and directors, or their employees and
agents, following a violation of the bribery provisions).
74 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u (Law. Co-op. 1999).
' See id. § 78u (d)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii).
76 A penalty cap prevents the application of the last two tiers. See infra
note 80 (imposing a penalty cap for FCPA actions brought by the SEC).
77 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii).
7' See id.5 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii).
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Congress amended the 1934 Act in 1988. Among the changes
to the Act was a FCPA-specific penalty, added to section 32(c),
which provided that any party capable of violating the FCPA and
under SEC jurisdiction "that violates section 30A(a) shall be sub-
ject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an ac-
tion brought by the Commission."79 The 1998 amendments to
the FCPA also made necessary adjustments to section 32(c).80
4.1. SEC Remedies Against Issuers Who Violate the FCPA
During an FCPA enforcement action against an issuer, the
SEC may select from among four different types of civil sanc-
tions.81 As previously indicated, the newly amended section 32(c)
allows for a maximum civil monetary penalty of $10,000.82 The
general remedies, made available to the SEC through section 21 of
the 1934 Act, still allow the SEC to bring injunctive actions
against those about to engage in an FCPA violation.83 The three-
tiered monetary penalties, however, appear to be preempted by
section 32(c)'s penalty cap. As a third sanction, "[t]he SEC also
may enter a cease and desist order."84 Finally, a violating party
that functions as a contractor with the U.S. government may face
debarment as mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations
System.8
Overall, these remedies are far from severe. A $10,000 penalty
would barely effect many of the wealthy issuers under SEC juris-
diction. Of course, such a penalty might have a greater impact on
an individual who violates the FCPA, such as a non-indemnified
agent of an issuer. Nevertheless, corporations that are registered
with the SEC seek to maximize profits; such a goal cannot be ac-
complished if the corporation finds itself constantly paying out
Id. , 78ff(c)(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (FCPA-specific criminal penalties
were also included in this section).
80 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,H.R.
REP. No. 105-802 (1998), at 3 (maintaining the $10,000 maximum penalty in
civil actions brought by the Commission and ensuring that the penalty would
apply to S 30A(g), the newly created alternative jurisdiction for the SEe).
8 See DOING BusINEss IN THE US, supra note 66, S 33.05(3)(c)(iii) (explain-
ing the four remedies available to the SEC).
82 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 73.
84 See DOING BUSINESS IN THE US, supra note 66, S 33.05(3)(c)(iii).
85 See 48 C.F.R. S 9.406-2 (1999);see also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), at
10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1784.
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$10,000 penalties to the U.S. government. 6 An injunction requir-
ing a violator not to engage in activities that violate the FCPA
appears to be similarly benign. However, a violation of such an
injunction could lead to greater penalties, assessed by the federal
courts. The injunction process might provide the issuer with un-
wanted publicity, which could affect stock prices, other interna-
tional dealings, and business in general. The same holds true if
the SEC seeks a cease and desist order. The final penalty,
debarment, can prevent an issuer from entering a market created
by the U.S. government's procurement needs. Debarment oper-
ates as a disqualification from consideration for obtaining gov-
ernment contracts.
Whatever actual effect FCPA penalties have on violators, it is
clear that the SEC recognizes the importance of FCPA enforce-
ment and the resulting sanctions. Otherwise the recent increase
and predictions of increased FCPA enforcement actions would
not likely have occurred. The SEC has determined that FCPA
enforcement is worth the possible sacrifice of some other en-
forcement actions and, therefore, has allocated some of its limited
resources 87 to this function.
4.2. SEC Remedies Against Attorneys Who Provide Advice
Leading to an Issuer's FCPA Violation
The SEC may, in certain situations, bring actions against pro-
fessionals88 whose conduct violates or aids in the violation of the
securities laws. Certain conduct by attorneys is clearly open to
SEC enforcement actions, such as the use of material non-public
information concerning a merger when obtained through the at-
torney's fiduciary relationship with a client for trading purposes.89
Additionally, "[t]he federal securities laws contain express and
implied secondary liability provisions.""' Section 20 of the 1934
86 Even if the benefits gained from a foreign corrupt practice outweigh the
additional $10,000 cost, a repeat offender will likely attract the DOJ's attention
and subject itself to considerably harsher penalties.
87 See infra Section 5.1.
88 Professionals in this context refer to accountants and attorneys.
89 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1982) (asserting that an
attorney has a fiduciary duty to his corporate clients due to his access to non-
public corporate information).
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Act imposes liability on those who control or aid and abet a pri-
mary violator.91 Controlling persons are "jointly and severally
liable with the controlled person."92 Of course, an attorney who
is hired by an issuer simply to render advice can hardly be consid-
ered a controlling person. Thus, potential liability for attorneys
as controlling persons is unlikely to appear in an FCPA investiga-
tion.
The statute also states:
[A]ny person that knowingly provides substantial assis-
tance to another person in violation of a provision of [the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934], or of any rule or regula-
tion issued under [it], shall be deemed to be in violation of
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided.93
The SEC can bring aiding and abetting actions against attor-
neys under 15 U.S.C. section 78t(f). This provision "is applicable
to actions brought by the Commission pursuant to section
21(d)(1) (for an injunction) and to section 21(d)(3) (to impose a
penalty)." 94 As indicated, penalties for FCPA violations may be
sought under section 21(d)(1) and (3).9' Accordingly, attorneys,
who aid and abet primary violators penalized under section 21,
can face SEC enforcement actions under section 20.96 It is impor-
tant to remember, however, that section 20 contains a scienter re-
quirement: the attorney must "knowingly provide substantial as-
sistance."' 7 As a result of this difficult requirement, the SEC may
generally expect little success in regulating attorneys as aiders and
abettors.
"' See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78t (Law. Co-op. 1999);see also ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 301:616 (1996) (providing analyses
of three criteria required to establish aiding and abetting liability and various
courts' treatments of controling persons liability).
92 KAUFMAN, supra note 90, S 10:04, at 10.
9 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t(o (Law. Co-op. 1999).
9 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN
SECURITIES LAW § 1.12, at 461 (1997-98 ed.).
9' Monetary penalties, however, cannot exceed $10,000 pursuant to FCPA
amendments.
96 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t.
17 Id. S 78t(f).
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Another tool that the SEC may use to find attorneys liable in
the context of FCPA violations is Rule 102(e).9" In its report that
accompanied the initial FCPA bill," the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs recognized that the SEC
may bring civil actions as well as hold administrative proceedings
under Rule 102(e), which authorizes the SEC "to censure, sus-
pend, or bar professionals, such as... lawyers, from practicing
before the Commission."' This report suggests that the FCPA's
drafters originally conceived of SEC actions under Rule 102(e)
against attorneys stemming from FCPA investigations. This,
however, is the only discussion of Rule 102(e) proceedings and
neither House report addresses such liability.' Rule 102(e) likely
can be used in conjunction with the FCPA, but the SEC chooses
not to do so.
The SEC possesses the means to bring enforcement actions
against attorneys whose advice leads to violations of the FCPA,
but it chooses not to exercise these options. In order to under-
stand this decision, the SEC's various calculations require consid-
eration. First, however, alternative remedies that may be sought
against counsel merit exploration.
4.3. Private Malpractice Actions Available to Issuers
The federal securities laws give way, at times, to private rights
of action. Although the SEC holds primary responsibility for en-
forcing the securities laws, it often allows private parties to bring
their own suits against violators.0 2 This provides a second level
of securities law monitoring. Parties allowed private rights of ac-
tion will exercise those rights if damaged severely enough by a
violation. Private rights of action also enable regulatory gaps to
be filled where the SEC cannot investigate and bring enforcement
9' 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1995).
99 See S. 305, 95th Cong. (1977).
100 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 12, n.6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1784.
101 See supra notes 51-61.
102 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
13.1, at 446 (3d ed. 1996) ("Although the securities laws provide a wide vari-
ety of express statutory remedies for injured investors, powerful private en-
forcement weapons have arisen out of implied rights of action.");Louis LOSS &
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 969 (3d ed.
1995) ("Persons injured in securities transactions are frequently able to choose
among a substantial number of private remedies.").
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actions." 3 Private actions, therefore, may sometimes be the only
actions brought against a violator.
One important private right of action exists outside the fed-
eral securities laws: the attorney malpractice suit. If certain crite-
ria are met, a client may successfully sue counsel for malpractice.
An attorney is liable to a client if, while acting in her professional
capacity, she "supplies false information for the guidance of oth-
ers in their business transactions," and causes the client to suffer
pecuniary loss as a result of the client's "justifiable reliance upon
the information, if [the attorney] fails to exercise reasonable care
or competence in obtaining or communicating the informa-
tion.""0 In addition, "[p]rofessional persons in general.., are re-
quired not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but
also to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and abil-
ity." 105 In light of these guidelines, the jury in a malpractice suit is
instructed that the professional whose conduct is in question
"must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily pos-
sessed and employed by members of the profession in good stand-
ing." 106
An attorney malpractice suit usually requires that the plaintiff
call expert witnesses to testify as to what constitutes the appropri-
ate standard of care and requisite special knowledge and ability for
a professional."' Since experts may offer different opinions on
this matter, the outcome of a malpractice suit cannot be prede-
termined easily. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a successful mal-
practice action increases with the negligence of the attorney's
conduct. In situations where an attorney is retained to give a legal
opinion based on a federal statute, little room is afforded to the
attorney to misinterpret an unambiguous statute and remain
within the standard of care. The activities prohibited by the
103 See infra Section 5.1 (discussing the SEC's limited resources and exercise
of prosecutorial discretion).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
105 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984).
'e Id. at 187 (discussing the formula used for doctors, which is generally
applied to other professionals as well).
107 See, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 804 (1975); O'Neil v.
Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982) (indicating that a plaintiff must call ap-
propriate experts to testify as to standard of care if plaintiff is to make out a
prima facie case of malpractice against an attorney).
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FCPA are clear and are open to few differing interpretations."'
In fact, the major discrepancy present after the FCPA's 1977 en-
actment- the mental state required for a violation to occur- has
been largely set aside through the 1988 amendment.1 9 Thus, at-
torney malpractice suits stemming from incorrect FCPA interpre-
tations should be successful assuming the plaintiff can prove the
necessary elements of the malpractice action ° other than breach
of the standard of care.
5. ECONOMIC ARGUMENT
5.1. The SEC's Limited Resources
United States government agencies must execute their assigned
functions within the limits allowed by their budgets. The SEC is
not exempt from this general rule of operation. The SEC, how-
ever, can defray many of its expenses through the use of offsetting
collections."' These collections include fees paid by corporations
to register securities with the SEC. In 1997, there was a fee of
$303 per $1,000,000 of securities offered.' This fee was reduced
in 1998 to $295 per $1,000,000 and will be reduced to $278 per
$1,000,000 in 1999.113 The SEC has at its disposal the excess of the
first $200 fee, which is paid into the general fund of the U.S.
Treasury. Therefore, assuming a constant rate of securities offer-
ings, the SEC can expect a decrease in collections." 4
Budget estimates indicate that the SEC's total net salaries and
expenses will increase, causing its 1997 surplus of $62 million to
"0' See supra Section 1 (detailing the activity prohibited by section 78dd-
1(a)).
109 See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd-i(f)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1999); see also HAZEN, supra
note 102, S 19.2, n. 9.
110 These include the existence and breach of a duty, injury, and causation.
... See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Analytical Perspectives,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 571
(1998). The SEC funding chart indicates that the $262 million in gross salaries
and expenses for 1997 were offset by collections totaling $324 million. Thus,
the net total for salaries and expenses was -$62 million. See id. at 571.
112 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999 app. 1135 (1998).
113 See id.
114 Other fees that may be used by the Commission are indicated in § 6(b)
of the Securities Act of 1933 and S 31 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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reach deficiencies of $13 million in the years 2000 through 2003."1
During this period of time, the SEC's offsetting collections are
expected to decrease while gross salaries and expenses are gener-
ally expected to increase." 6 Gross salaries and expenses are pro-
jected to increase by $81 million between 1997 and 1999.117 Se-
lected workload data for those three years, however, indicates a
fairly stable amount of activity within the SEC's Division of En-
forcement."'
The Division of Enforcement then can be expected to con-
tinue engaging in selective enforcement of the securities laws as
mandated by a limited budget. In light of this budget constraint,
the SEC pursues enforcement actions which offer the most bene-
fit for their cost. These include highly visible actions against ma-
jor securities firms, insider trading actions promising fairly sub-
stantial disgorgements of funds, and other actions whose penalties
serve to deter others from engaging in future violative acts.
Such selective enforcement by the SEC is protected as a matter
committed to agency discretion by law. Such matters include "al-
location of prosecutorial effort." 9 This protection finds legal
support in a 1985 Supreme Court decision12 and is designed to al-
low "day-to-day working judgments how most effectively to de-
ploy the limited resources Congress has placed at [an agency's]
command."121
11 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 111, at app.
571. The deficiencies include Congressional appropriations. See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 111, at app.
1135 (1998). This chart estimates an increase in investigations opened from 408
in 1997 to 410 in 1998; investigations opened in 1999 are also expected to be at
the 410 level. A slight decrease is expected in the number of administrative
proceedings opened. See id. There were 286 in 1997 and 285 are expected in
1998 and again in 1999. The number of civil actions opened in 1998 and 1999
are expected to remain at 1997's level of 205. See id.
119 PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES 222 (1989).
120 See Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656 (1985) (holding that agency
decisions not to take enforcement actions are presumed to be unreviewable);see
also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in federal
cases).
12 STRAUSS, supra note 119, at 222.
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5.2. The SEC's Penalties Against Attorneys
The SEC may seek penalties in three types of actions brought
against attorneys whose advice led a primary party to violate the
FCPA. These include actions against attorneys as controlling per-
sons, 122 aider and abettor actions,1" and Rule 102(e) proceedings. 24
Among the penalties that may be sought are injunctions, cease
and desist orders, monetary penalties, and debarment. Neverthe-
less, the application of these penalties to attorneys promises only
limited results.
Injunctions and cease and desist orders are designed to prevent
current action from continuing or imminent action from being
taken. Thus, an attorney who gave incorrect FCPA advice would
be enjoined from doing so in the future. Other than the bad pub-
licity inherent in facing an SEC investigation and being found li-
able, injunctions and cease and desist orders provide little more
than a warning to such an attorney. In addition, it is unlikely
that such a remedy would be applied under controlling person or
aiding and abetting actions: under these actions, if the SEC finds
the attorney in violation, the attorney can be held jointly and sev-
erally liable, thus subjecting him to whatever remedy is selected
for the primary violator- such as monetary penalties.
Monetary penalties for aiding and abetting or controlling per-
son liability would likely be assessed to the extent of the FCPA's
maximum $10,000 provision. Controlling person liability assesses
joint and several liability "with and to the same extent as," the
controlled person"' and the aiding and abetting provision asserts
that the person who gave assistance "shall be deemed to be in vio-
lation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided."126 This suggests that if an attorney
were found liable, a monetary penalty could not exceed $10,000.
Of course, if his violation were due to more than negligent con-
duct and "involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or
reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement," the second or
third tier penalties of section 21(d)(3)(B) of the 1934 Act might
'2 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t(a)-(b) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
122 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t(a (Law. Co-op. 1999).
124 See 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e) (1999).
.. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t(a).
2 Id. § 78t(f).
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apply.V Such penalties certainly would be more significant than
the $10,000 maximum allowed by the FCPA. However, an in-
terpretation of negligence of the FCPA is more likely to occur
when providing advice to a client since the attorney would reap
little benefit from a client's FCPA violation.
Following a determination of negligence, a Rule 102(e) pro-
ceeding may be convened by the Commission. "[T]he SEC can
discipline attorneys under SEC Rule of Practice 102(e) which
provides that the Commission may suspend, limit or bar 'any
person' from practicing before it 'in any way."'128 Furthermore,
"professional misconduct, although not violating the securities
laws, can be grounds for a Rule 102(e) suspension from practice
before the SEC."129 Barring an attorney from practicing before
the SEC appears to be a fairly detrimental penalty. A securities
lawyer's livelihood often stems from his practice and dealings
with the SEC, whether in the context of offering securities, draft-
ing prospectuses, or providing representation to a client during an
SEC investigation. Thus, SEC debarment greatly reduces a secu-
rities lawyer's employment options.
The SEC, however, tends to convene Rule 102(e) proceedings
in situations where attorneys and accountants have made misrep-
resentations in violation of disclosure requirements or signed reg-
istration materials with knowledge of an issuer's deficiency."' In
other words, the SEC employs Rule 102(e) most often to regulate
attorneys who make, or apparently approve, misleading represen-
tations to the investing public. Advice to a client concerning the
legality of an overseas payment is not a public representation be-
cause it does not affect the public's investment decisions, and,
"27 Second tier penalties may not "exceed the greater of (1) $50,000 for a
natural person or $250,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pe-
cuniar gain to such defendant as a result of the violation." 15 U.S.C.S. 5
78u(d)())(ii). Third tier penalties may not"exceed the greater of (1) $100,000
for a natural person or $500,000 for any other person, or (I) the gross amount
of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation." 15 U.S.C.S.
S 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
128 HAZEN, supra note 102, 5 7.10.
129 Id.
130 See KAUFMAN, supra note 90, § 10:04 (explaining common situations of
attorney liability under 5 12(a) (2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated under § 20(b) of the 1934 Act). SEC actions against at-
torneys in these contexts are quite understandable since these two sections con-
cern the prmary focuses of the two statues- registration and disclosure under
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, respectively.
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therefore, is treated differently than public statements or show-
ings of approval.
In light of all the penalty options available to the SEC when a
primary FCPA violator acts on advice of counsel, a Rule 102(e)
debarment seems to offer the greatest deterrence. A debarred se-
curities lawyer would lose considerably more money from lost
business than from the $10,000 maximum penalty he would have
to pay under the FCPA as an aider and abettor or a controlling
person. Moreover, since the activity required to trigger second
and third tier penalties under section 21 is difficult to prove,131
most SEC FCPA investigations of attorneys and their advice
would seem to suggest that either injunctive or Rule 102(e) relief
should be sought. Although Rule 102(e) certainly acts as a greater
deterrent than an injunction or a cease and desist order, Rule
102(e) sanctions are not sought for two compelling reasons. First,
attorneys are reluctant to bring suits against other attorneys. Sec-
ond, private actions and remedies allow for a more efficient regu-
latory structure with respect to the monitoring the conduct of at-
torneys who offer advice regarding the FCPA.
5.3. Attorneys'Reluctance to Bring Suits Against
Other Attorneys
Members of the legal profession are familiar with the signifi-
cance of setting precedents. In fact, precedent functions as one of
the main guides in determining an attorney's course of action
when attending to a client's needs. As a result, attorneys are care-
ful not to establish precedents that could, ultimately, cause harm
to themselves. "Lawyers punish other lawyers for very flagrant
violations- stealing a client's money, for example. For most
other offenses, and for plain incompetence, lawyers are (under-
standably) rather gentle with themselves."132 This is not surpris-
ing, as such an attitude tends to limit the gamut of attorney li-
abilities. Therefore, those offenses, such as "plain incompetence,"
which are not punished by other attorneys, must be addressed by
explicit legislation. However, attorneys are fairly prevalent in
most legislatures. Thus, the institution, of which they are a part,
131 See 15 U.S.c.S. § 78(u)(d)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (requiring sci-
enter, if not intentional, conduct).
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implicitly ensures individual attorneys' shelter from punishment
as a means of protecting its own existence.
5.4. Private Remedies
Private remedies offer a more efficient means of monitoring
attorneys whose advice leads to FCPA violations. The general
theory of privatization133 supports this assertion. While the own-
ers of public enterprises, tax-payers do not have a claim against
the assets of the enterprise, only the owners of private enterprises
can make such claims. The latter, therefore, possess a greater in-
centive to oversee the actions of the private enterprises' managers
and employees."' As a result, "private managers and employees
find it difficult to engage in... behavior that is inconsistent with
maximizing the present value of the private enterprise (the own-
ers' wealth)."135 Thus, in theory, "private and public managers
and employees can be expected to behave in different ways and, as
a result, private firms will be more efficient than public firms."136
This theory of increased efficiency also holds true in the context
of private actions brought by issuers against attorneys for provid-
ing advice leading to FCPA violations. A few factors contribute
to this enforcement efficiency.
5.4.1. Monetary Damages
A private malpractice suit offers the plaintiff three possible
types of damages. First, attorney fees incurred during the mal-
practice suit might be available depending on what the substantive
malpractice law and local procedural rules allow.13 Such fees,
however, might be comparatively minor in light of other damages
that could arise.
133 Privatization, a concept that emerged in the mid-1980s, involves "the
transfer of public assets, infrastructure, and service functions to the private sec-
tor." Steve H. Hanke, Privatization: Theory, Evidence, and Implementation, in
CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING at 101 (C. Lowell Harriss ed., 1985).
134 See id. at 102.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 103. Hanke also provides empirical evidence in support of this
contention. This evidence includes brief studies of Europe's nationalized indus-
tries, public-sector wages and productivity, administration, day care centers,
forestry, housing, and other areas in which some degree of privatization has oc-
curred.
137 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2).
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Malpractice is a cause of action under tort law. '38 As such, a
plaintiff issuer should be entitled to compensatory damages to re-
turn him to the position he would have been in had the tort not
occurred. Similar to a contract law remedy, a plaintiff may seek
the fees he paid an attorney for the FCPA advice sought to help
return the issuer to his position prior to his transaction with the
attorney. Alternatively, the issuer could seek damages for any
penalties paid to the SEC due to the FCPA violation. In addition,
the attorney would be liable for any costs that the issuer incurred
during the course of the SEC's FCPA investigation and enforce-
ment action. Finally, the issuer might seek damages to compen-
sate him for any harm to his reputation that resulted from public
disclosure of the FCPA violation. This last damages award, how-
ever, might be somewhat difficult to compute.139
In addition to compensatory relief, punitive damages also
might be available to the issuer. These are generally "not a matter
of right, and... [are] always within the discretion of the jury or
trial judge to withhold them." " In addition, such damages will
only be available if the attorney's "wrongdoing has been inten-
tional and deliberate."'41 Accordingly, mere negligence on the
part of the attorney will not suffice as a basis for an award of pu-
nitive damages. Therefore, since the attorney's conduct would
likely be no more than negligent, punitive damages will rarely be
awarded to an issuer bringing an malpractice action. Neverthe-
less, the possibility of punitive damages provides the private sec-
tor with a greater deterrent than that afforded the by SEC. The
1934 Act, however, precludes punitive damages, instead limiting
recovery to "actual damages."" Thus, private damages present a
monetary deterrent that is greater than SEC remedies' deterrent
power. Moreover, even if punitive damages are not awarded, the
compensatory damages assessment may exceed the FCPA's
$10,000 damages limitation.
138 See KEETON, supra note 25.
139 A drop in the issuer's stock price might provide a starting point for
making this calculation.
140 KEETON, supra note 25, § 2, at 14.
141 Id. at 9.
142 15 U.S.C.S. S 78bb(a) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
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5.4.2. Issuers and Their Resources
Publicly traded companies that are registered with the SEC
occupy a position that is almost completely unique to the private
sector. 43 These issuers generally possess considerable assets. Issu-
ers that conduct business overseas and are capable of making
payments to foreign officials to increase business opportunities
may generate revenues that are comparable to, or even dwarf, the
SEC's annual budget.'4
Even issuers that do not bring in such large revenues still pos-
sess monetary resources unique to the private sector. Issuers have
considerable discretion in the allocation of their resources as op-
posed to the SEC's discretion in the allocation of the U.S. Gov-
ernment's resources. The directors and officers of a corporation
must answer to the corporation's shareholders, but are relatively
free141 to allocate resources in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.146 The SEC, on the other hand, cannot allocate the govern-
ment's resources, but must first wait until the government dis-
tributes the SEC's share of these resources through the budget
process. Following this distribution, SEC spending is limited to
activities for which special funds were designated or activities
which the SEC established in its budget calculations during a pre-
vious year.
Issuers possess an additional resource that is often unavailable
to the SEC in FCPA enforcement actions. The SEC may have
difficulty gaining access to certain documents created by an is-
suer's advising attorneys due to the attorney-client privilege. Is-
suers, however, would have greater access to these documents
while preparing and bringing an attorney malpractice suit.
Issuers generally maintain three resource advantages over the
SEC. First, many private corporations possess assets at or above
143 Only the U.S. military's assets rival those of many companies.
'4 In 1997, the SEC's actual salaries and expenses (gross) totaled $262 mil-
lion. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 111, at 571.
145 The only constraint is that directors and officers of a corporation must
allocate resources by following the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 95 fll. App. 2d 173(1968) (applying the business judgment rule to a
decision by the corporation's directors).
146 The best interests of the corporation are usually considered to be those
which lead to profit maximization. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsi-
bility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32
(discussing corporate decision-making and the allocation of resources to chari-
table organizations).
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the SEC's level. Second, corporate directors and officers are
granted more discretion than the SEC to use their respective re-
sources. Third, issuers that choose to bring private actions against
their attorneys are generally afforded greater access than the SEC
to critical evidentiary materials. The combination of these three
advantages likely places the private sector in a better position than
the SEC to regulate itself and those who operate within it.
5.4.2.1. Issuers May Choose to Use Resources to Sue and
Will Use Them More Efficiently than the SEC
Following an enforcement action determining that an issuer
has violated the FCPA, the corporation's directors and officers
will face two choices, assuming the violation occurred after the
issuer acted on errant advice of counsel. The issuer may elect to
sue its counsel for malpractice and try to seek various remedies, or
the corporation may choose not to bring an action against the at-
torney. The decision would likely be based on several factors.
First, the directors and officers would need to determine the vi-
ability of the suit, possibly by examining the elements of an at-
torney malpractice suit. If the directors and officers of the corpo-
ration can establish the elements of a malpractice suit and have
sufficient means to prove their existence- especially a breach of
the standard of care147- such as access to documents through
which advice was given and through which the issuer described
the situation, for which advice was sought, to the attorney, then
the corporation likely would determine that a suit is viable. Sec-
ond, the issuer would want to identify alternative actions it could
take against the attorney.'48 Third, the officers and directors
would have to analyze the relative costs and benefits of choosing
not to sue, bringing a malpractice suit, or following an alternative
course of action. If a suit would not lead to profit maximization,
it might not be in the best interest of the corporation, and the di-
rectors and officers likely then would follow a different course of
action.
"4 See supra Section 4.3. (describing the construction of malpractice ac-
tions).
148 See infra Section 5.4.2.2.
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5.4.2.2. Issuers May Elect Not to Sue, but May Refrain from
Retaining the Attorney or Law Firm in the Future
One alternative is not to sue, but instead to cease using the le-
gal services of the attorney who offered incorrect advice. This
course of action would serve as a deterrent to attorneys who func-
tion in FCPA advising roles; however, it might not be as great a
deterrent as the threat of a malpractice suit. The legal market op-
erates on the basis of reputation. Clients seek the best legal repre-
sentation and advice that they can afford, while all attorneys and
law firms strive to attract clients. Competition among law firms
to attract clients can be fierce, and a client that disassociates itself
from one firm can usually find a fairly long list of possible re-
placements. In this type of market, there is little demand for at-
torneys who offer incorrect advice."" The threat of losing clients,
therefore, should deter attorneys from taking actions that would
lead to such losses. Additionally, law firms would face the same
deterrent effect and would likely refrain from hiring or continu-
ing to employ attorneys who drive clients away. The only disad-
vantage to using this alternative as a deterrent inheres in the col-
lective action problem.' However, since many issuers who do
not retain new counsel instead choose to bring malpractice suits,
the collective action problem appears to become a non-problem-
either alternative is undesirable from the attorney's point of view.
And, although some issuers may choose not to act at all, the
threat of some type of action should be great enough to maintain
a deterrent effect.
Both bringing a malpractice suit or discontinuing use of an at-
torney's legal services carry a deterrent effect. Although a suc-
cessful malpractice suit promises substantially greater rewards to
the issuer bringing it, such actions are significantly more expen-
' Clients that participate in this legal market- clients that are likely to
face possible FCPA violations- should be considered fairly sophisticated par-
ties.
150 The collective action problem, often referred to as the prisoner's di-
lemma, focuses on the reluctance of multiple parties to cooperate and act in the
manner most beneficial to all of the parties. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & J.
MARK RAMSEYER, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
CORPORATIONS 128-31 (3d ed. 1997). In the situation at issue, the collective
action problem suggests that while some issuers might choose not to retain
counsel in the future, many others will not follow this option. Thus, attorneys
and law firms might not recognize as great a possibility for potential loss and
therefore will not-be deterred from rendering incorrect advice.
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sive than retaining new counsel. Of course, the officers and direc-
tors will take this factor into account when deciding what course
of action to follow. The threat of a non-legal sanction, therefore,
ensures that some response is available to issuers of differing fi-
nancial positions.
5.5. Private Remedies as More Efficient and Effective
Deterrents than SEC Enforcement
The statutory ability of the SEC to regulate attorneys who
provide errant advice to issuers, thereby leading to an FCPA vio-
lation, is easily recognizable. Whether the Commission seeks an
injunction, chooses to bring an action against an attorney for aid-
ing and abetting, or utilizes a Rule 102(e) proceeding, remedies
against attorneys are available. Nevertheless, the SEC elects not
to engage in such regulation, deferring instead to the private sec-
tor. This approach constitutes a more efficient and effective de-
terrent than SEC enforcement.
The SEC conducts its activities within the constraints of a lim-
ited budget.15' Despite its need to exact the maximum benefit
from each budgeted dollar, the Commission's managers and em-
ployees,152 operating within the public sector, face little personal
accountability to the taxpaying public." 3 They function within a
bureaucratic apparatus that offers considerable anonymity. 54 The
managers and employees of issuer corporations, 5 5 however, are
personally accountable to the share-holders of the corporation.5 6
Federal reporting rules ensure that these managers and employees
cannot work with the same anonymity as their public sector
counterparts.5 5 Thus, a more efficient work product emerges
from highly accountable, private sector managers and employees
who must seek to maximize profits in the best interest of their re-
spective corporations. This work product includes a more effi-
cient regulation of attorneys who provide incorrect advice,
thereby leading to greater deterrence.
1 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 112, at 133-34.
152 Employees include commissioners, attorneys, accountants, etc.
153 See Hanke, supra note 133, at 102 (containing a theoretical discussion of
the accountability of public officials).
154 Id. at 103.
155 These are corporate directors, officers, and other employees.
156 See generally HAZEN, supra note 102, §13.10.
157 See id. §13.10, at 631-32.
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just as the SEC is less efficient than the private sector in deal-
ing with attorney malpractice, SEC remedies provide compara-
tively less effective deterrence. SEC injunctions simply prevent
attorneys from continuing an unacceptable practice, but provide
little in the way of punishment. The FCPA limits monetary pen-
alties, for attorneys liable as controlling persons or as aiders and
abettors,158 to $10,000.159 Second and third tier penalties only ap-
ply to the few attorneys who intentionally mislead their clients.
Thus, the majority of liable attorneys would only face fines up to
$10,000 as a result of SEC enforcement.
A significant disparity in resources exists between the private
sector and the SEC.161 Issuers can take advantage of their various
resources in order to bring actions against attorneys, whereas the
SEC is limited in its enforcement capabilities. Thus, the private
sector, rather than the SEC, promises to be the source of more ac-
tions against attorneys. Two additional characteristics of private
remedies suggest that private actions are more efficient than SEC
suits against attorneys. First, private malpractice suits can offer
considerably more than a $10,000 fine as a deterrent. Second, an
issuer's decision to pursue the alternative of refusing to retain the
attorney in the future offers a similarly high deterrent value.
6. SEC REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS IN LIGHT
OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
RELATING TO THE FCPA
6.1. The International Anti-bribery Convention
Despite U.S. efforts to combat bribery of foreign officials by
issuers and domestic concerns of seeking access to the markets of
other countries, the FCPA, until recently, existed as a unique
I See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
S 301:616 (1996).
159 See 15 U.S.C.S. S 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
160 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
161 As a result, entities within the private sector can often afford to obtain
greater amounts of information than the SEC and can apply considerable dis-
cretion in using such information. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 102,
at 311 ("[T]helarger insurance companies are not only 'able to fend for them-
selves;' sometimes they seem to elicit even more information than the SEC
does.").
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statute among the "major countr[ies]." 62 As a result, regulated
entities protested that they suffered at the hands of the FCPA, ar-
guing that foreign-registered competitors were relatively free to
make the very payments to foreign officials which are prohibited
by the FCPA.'63 In fact, $15 billion in orders were lost, in one
year, "to firms from other countries that allow bribes."'" In re-
sponse, the United States lobbied for a multinational anti-bribery
agreement. 165
These U.S. initiatives preceded the efforts that have helped
usher in the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") Convention.'66 In 1975, the United
States presented the issue of corporate bribery to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 67 No action was
taken by GATT, or the United Nations ("UN"), in response to
this effort.'68 Similarly, the UN took no responsive action.' Al-
though the UN adopted a resolution to draft a treaty concerning
corporate foreign bribery,' 70 this act constituted "part of the his-
tory of unsuccessful efforts within the UN to control real and
perceived evils of multinationals operating in third world and
nonmarket economies."17 ' The inability to secure a strong, multi-
national anti-bribery provision within the OECD, GATT, and
the UN led observers to "consider the issue on a multinational
162 DOING BusINEss IN THE US, supra note 66, S 33.05(3)(d). But see
RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BusINESs
TRANSACTIONS § 12.42 (1995) ("Only Sweden has adopted a law with sanc-
tions similar to the United States.").
163 See id. § 12.42 (Supp. 1998) (indicating that a 1996 U.S. Government re-
port "suggested that there was evidence that U.S. firms lost at least 36 contracts
worth some $11 billion because of corrupt payments," while"U.S. firms sug-
gested the figures to be closer to 139 contracts worth about $64 billion.").
'64 Honest Trade: A Global War Against Bribery, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16,
1999, at 22-23 [hereinafter Honest Trade].
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See FOLSOM AND GORDON, supra note 162, S 12.44.
168 See id. 12.44-.45.
169 See id. 12.45.
170 See U.N. Economic and Social Council, Resolution to Convene a Con-
ference to Draft a Treaty on Corrupt Practices, U.N.DOC.NOP.
E/Res/1978/71 (1978), available in FOLSOM AND GORDON, supra note 162,
12.45.
171 FOLSOM AND GORDON, supra note 162, § 12.45.
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level to be dormant or dead."172 The issue, however, is certainly
not dead, and if it was indeed dormant it awoke during the mid-
to-late-1990s.
In 1996, four multinational organizations acted to combat cor-
ruption and bribery of foreign officials. The Organization of
American States ("OAS") drafted and approved the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption.1 3 During the same
month that the OAS approved its Convention, the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") initiated efforts to strengthen its
rules and procedures regarding bribery. 4 The World Bank
Group also promulgated anti-bribery guidelines in 1996.175 These
guidelines provide the World Bank with the power to regulate
loan bidders and borrowers in the event they engage in "fraudu-
lent or corrupt conduct."1 16 The International Monetary Fund
("IMF") adopted anti-bribery guidelines in 1997 that "enunciate a
policy of denying financial assistance to countries where corrup-
tion is so pervasive that it threatens economic recovery pro-
grams." 177 The efforts by these organizations represented a new
international desire to combat foreign corrupt practices by corpo-
rations. This desire, influenced by various international devel-
opments, 1 8 ultimately led to the recent OECD Convention. The
United States undoubtedly played a major role in orchestrating
this FCPA-like convention, likely because of its interest in the
Convention's success. Between May 1994 and April 1998, the
172 Id.
173 See Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996); see also DOING
BUSINESS IN THE US, supra note 66, § 13.2.
" See International Chamber of Commerce: 1996 Revisions to the ICC
Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transac-
tions, Mar. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1306 (1996).
17 See World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA
Credits (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr
/procure /biddingb.html>.
176 DOING BUSINESS IN THE US, supra note 66, S 13.4.
1"7 Id. § 13.5 (reviewing the role of the IMF in Governance Issues- Guid-
ance); see Note, International Monetary Fund, available in IMF News Brief No.
97/15 (Aug. 4, 1997).
178 Among these were: corruption occurring under the unsuspecting Euro-
pean Commission; developments regarding the 2002 Winter Olympics; dissatis-
action with Indonesia's President Suharto and similar displeasure with gov-
ernments in Zimbabwe, Italy, Brazil, Pakistan, and Zaire; and economic crises
in Russia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Bulgaria. See Honest Trade, supra note
164, at 22.
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"U.S. government received allegations that bribes were used to in-
fluence the outcome of 239 international contract competi-
tions." "9 These contracts supposedly totaled $108 billion, and
approximately 75% of these cases involved companies from
OECD member countries.
180
Twenty years after the FCPA's inception, the countries com-
prising the OECD agreed to the Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions. 18  Prior to this Convention, the OECD had a set of
guidelines on corporate bribery; however, their effect was mini-
mal. 182 The new Convention called for OECD member countries
"to introduce laws in their national legislatures by April 1998 that
would subject companies to criminal penalties for bribing foreign
officials while soliciting business."" U.S. compliance with the
Convention only required an amendment to the FCPA. 8 Other
countries also created legislation in order to comply with the
Convention. 8
6.1.1. Other Countries
U.S. compliance with the OECD Convention was met with
little resistance from Congress. This type of anti-bribery prohibi-
tion was nothing new to U.S. securities laws and business prac-
tices. Compliance in the international community, however,
... Glenn R. Simpson, Foreign Deals Rely on Bribes, U.S. Contends, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 23, 1999, at A3.
180 See id.
181 See DOING BUSINESS IN THE US, supra note 66, 33.05(3)(d).
182 See FOLSOM AND GORDON, supra note 162, 12.43 ("The OECD in
1976, at the urging of the United States, adopted a set of decisions and guide-
lines- a voluntary code- for its member nations. The guidelines have scarcely
been heard from since.").
183 DOING BUSINESS INTHE US, supra note 66, S 33.05(3)(d).
184 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-04 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. % 78dd-
1, 78dd-2, 78m (Law. Co-op. 1999)) (amending the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977).
15 Thirty-four countries have ratified the Convention, including the "29
members of the OECD, along with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the
Slovak Republic." Anti-Corruption: OECD Begins Study of Compliance with
Anti-Corruption Treaty Outlawing Bribery, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY (BNA),
Apr. 28, 1999, at 1; see also Russia: OECD, Russia Agrees to Establish Group to
Fight Corruption in Business, Government, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY (BNA),
July 29, 1999, at 2 (reporting that the OECD is"' ready to open discussions' for
Russia to join the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention." ).
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might face varying levels of opposition. The OECD members
will have to monitor each other's efforts as they adapt to their re-
spective versions of the new legislation.186 The responses from
foreign business enterprises will also merit the OECD's attention.
While some "[n]ations in transition have made some attempts
to correct bribery," it "remains extremely serious" in other coun-
tries, such as China."' Three classifications of corruption have
been created by the British organization, Control Risks.188 These
classifications include payments "to officials and business persons
for favorable treatment," "nepotism carried to a level of domina-
tion of business by family and clan interests," and "the evolution
of corruption into organized crime, with the participation of offi-
cials at the highest levels of government."189 Although the first
category of corruption invites FCPA violations, the presence of
activity contemplated by the other two categories suggests that a
government may also be susceptible to bribery.
It appears, however, that the Convention might not face its
greatest difficulty in countries with epidemic private sphere cor-
ruption, but in countries that have, at times, recognized little dif-
ference between the state and its private business enterprises.
Also, countries that regulated bribery in a loose manner prior to
the Convention might prevent total Convention adherence. For
example, a German law concerning unfair competition does not
prohibit general acts of bribery. 9 Instead, German law prohibits
kick-backs to employees or agents of a business establishment "for
the purpose of competition." 91 However, this law does not pro-
186 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,supra
note 184, at 3311.
187 FOLsOM & GORDON, supra note 162, S 12.4 (relating a Chinese source
that "reported that in the first half [of] 1996, 34,070 cases of economic crimes
had been reported (bribes, embezzlement, graft, etc.) involving more than 7,000
officials, including 3,017 managers of state owned industries and 2,141 involved
with banking and-negotiable securities").
188 See id.
189 Id. The first classification is commonly addressed by FCPA-like prohi-
bitions. The second classification, which has been common in Indonesia, and
the third classification, "a problem with the former Soviet states," require
greater domestic attention from the governments within the countries facing
these types of corruption. Id.
19' See 4 BuSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY § 37.05 (Dennis Campbell
et al. eds., 1999).
191 Id.
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scribe bribes paid to the owner of a business establishment."
Thus, a more comprehensive bribery prohibition might initially
face some friction in its implementation and acceptance by busi-
ness entities.
Countries where an FCPA-like prohibition might actually re-
ceive greater support are those whose national laws are based on
Islamic Law. A portion of the Koran prohibits bribery.'93 Ac-
cordingly, a number of Islamic nations have adopted anti-bribery
provisions. 194 Nevertheless, these provisions focus on foreign
business enterprises trading with these governments, not on do-
mestic concerns and their trade practices with foreign govern-
ments. As Islamic countries, that already are active in the grow-
ing global economy, increase their participation in the global
economy, it is likely that an opportunity to monitor their im-
plementation of FCPA-like statutes will arise. The same holds
true for countries in other regions that also continue to play
larger roles in international trade.
6.1.2. The United States and the 1998 Amendments
to the FCPA
Ten years after it was last amended, the FCPA has undergone
significant change. Although the 1998 amendments did not ad-
dress the issue of regulating attorneys, several characteristics of
the legislation merit attention as they have broadened the scope of
the SEC's FCPA enforcement powers. First, section 30A now
prohibits payments, offers, and the giving of anything of value to
foreign officials, political parties, or conduits to officials or politi-
cal parties for the added purpose of "securing any improper ad-
vantage."' 95 This amendment expands SEC enforcement power
since any improper advantage that an issuer gains over its com-
petitors likely would qualify under the FCPA.
19z See id.
193 See WILLIAM M. HANNAY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AVOIDING
CRIMINAL RISKs S 6.02 (1991).
194 See id. §§ 6.02-6.04 (describing Iranian and Egyptian anti-bribery laws as
well as prohibited payment laws and policies in Kuwait, Bahrain, the United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar). But see id. (indicating restrictions on,
or a lack of, such laws and policies in Jordan, Iraq, and Oman).
19' International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, H.R.
REP. No. 105-802, at 3 (1998).
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A second significant amendment "expand[s] the definition of
'foreign official' to include an official of a public international or-
ganization."196 The amendment provides that such organizations
are those "designated by Executive Order pursuant to the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act... (22 U.S.C. [section]
288)," or "any other international organization that is designated
by the President for the purposes of this section."' 7 This new
provision adds potential targets of bribery and corruption which
the SEC can address. Recently, there has been a flurry of press
coverage concerning allegations that the Salt Lake Organizing
Committee made improper payments to International Olympic
Committee ("IOC") members in order to successfully secure Salt
Lake City as the site for the 2002 Winter Olympics.1 98 Since the
IOC is a private international organization, even if the FCPA
amendments already were in effect when the alleged bribery oc-
curred, the activity still would not have been enforceable under
the FCPA. However, the attention to corruption that this event
triggered should lead to heightened awareness, both within the
United States and abroad, concerning the problem of foreign cor-
rupt practices. In turn, this awareness likely will lead to increased
FCPA enforcement actions as SEC enforcement policies change
in response to shifting public (and congressional) concerns.
A third amendment will expand SEC enforcement opportuni-
ties by creating a new basis for SEC FCPA jurisdiction. Section
30A(g) provides for liability to be assessed against U.S. issuers or
U.S. persons acting as their agents who make prohibited pay-
ments outside of the United States, "irrespective of whether...
they make any use of the mails or means or instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce."199 Although it would seem that most over-
seas-prohibited payments by a U.S. issuer could in some way be
linked back through interstate commerce or the mails to the is-
suer, this portion of the amendment ensures that the SEC may en-
force the FCPA in instances where it otherwise cannot meet the
original jurisdictional means.
These three amendments, in addition to increased awareness
of and concern over corporate bribery of foreign officials, should
16 Id. at 19.
197 Id.
198 See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. to Probe Salt Lake City Olympics Bid,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1998, at A10; Honest Trade, supra note 164, at 22.
199 H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 20.
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help lead to an increase in FCPA enforcement actions, especially
as U.S. and foreign corporations continue to expand their opera-
tions across the globe. Although the FCPA amendments do not
address attorney liability, the monitoring of attorney conduct will
continue to be an important part of SEC enforcement policy.
The OECD's Convention will add new dimensions to this issue.
6.2. Ramifications Concerning the SEC and
Regulation ofAttorneys
The process of regulating international corporate corruption
and bribery of foreign officials is expanding in scope. Interna-
tional organizations and many OECD-member countries are
adopting measures to prevent corrupt activities. The three
amendments, discussed above, will enable the SEC to find addi-
tional FCPA violations which, a year ago, were outside the
agency's reach. In order to take advantage of these increased op-
portunities, the SEC will have to refocus its investigation and en-
forcement efforts.
The amended FCPA clearly establishes jurisdiction over
FCPA violators. SEC jurisdiction over foreign attorneys, who
may become involved in advising issuers overseas due to growing
international trade and economies, is not as definite. In fact, the
SEC's means of regulating the conduct of attorneys practicing be-
fore it in the United States, such as Rule 102(e), are not enforce-
able against foreign attorneys who do not practice before the
SEC. Due to the increased enforcement of the FCPA, which will
likely stretch the SEC budget, and the decreased regulatory ability
of the SEC with respect to foreign attorneys, it appears that the
SEC will become even less efficient and effective in regulating at-
torneys whose advice leads to FCPA violations.
This decrease in effectiveness and efficiency, however, should
be matched by an increase in the ability of the private sector to
regulate attorneys. As international trade and investment grows,
which is the goal of the OECD,2" corporations will have a greater
presence in foreign countries. Accompanying this market expan-
sion, corporations may find, depending on the laws of individual
countries, increased standing to bring attorney malpractice suits.
200 See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in
FOLSOM AND GORDON, supra note 162, § 23.30 ("The common aim of the
Member countries is to encourage the positive contributions which multina-
tional enterprises can make to economic and social progress .... ").
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In the alternative, corporations may choose not to use foreign at-
torneys for fear of not being able to bring actions for incorrect le-
gal advice. Foreign attorneys would, therefore, have an incentive
to provide accurate advice and to support the creation or reform
of attorney malpractice laws in their countries. Unless one or
both of these actions are taken, corporations will be less likely to
seek advice from foreign attorneys for any issue other than those
which routinely arise in the attorneys' respective countries.
Finally, it should be noted that the Convention places great
emphasis on the criminal punishment of bribery, an area in which
the SEC does not have jurisdiction. Perhaps criminal sanctions
are calculated to produce the greatest amount of international ad-
herence to anti-bribery statutes when enacted. The Convention
"require[s] countries to help each other prosecute cases; since each
country has an interest in preventing others from stealing an ad-
vantage by bribery, they will all want to monitor each other's ad-
herence to the new convention." 1 Assuming that countries help
each other prosecute, it is likely that they will focus on criminal
prosecutions. The Convention emphasizes criminal enforcement,
and most countries, in order to comply, have had to pass such
criminal legislation. SEC civil investigations, however, may not
be compatible with these criminal provisions. Of course, the
overall effect of these amendments, the Convention, and interna-
tional anti-bribery efforts on SEC FCPA enforcement and attor-
ney regulation will not become apparent until after the atmos-
phere sought to be created by the Convention comes fully into
existence.
7. CONCLUSION
Regulatory agencies within the U.S. government are required
to operate within limited budgets and structure their regulatory
policies with such constraints in mind. Like all agencies, the SEC
is required to perform its regulatory functions while adhering to
its annual budget. In order to accomplish this, the SEC must
maximize the benefits that it derives from every activity it
chooses to pursue. One way the SEC can effectively perform its
functions is by using its ability as an administrative agency to ex-
ercise prosecutorial discretion. The agency exercises this discre-
201 Honest Trade, supra note 164, at 24.
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tion throughout its various congressionally-created enforcement
responsibilities, including the enforcement of the FCPA.
The SEC defers to the private sector and allows clients to pur-
sue actions against attorneys whose advice leads a client to violate
the FCPA. The private sector is better situated to monitor these
attorneys due to its greater resources and comparatively greater
deterrent capabilities. Issuers may bring malpractice suits, the
threat of which itself is a deterrent. Malpractice suits are more ef-
fective than SEC actions due to the possibility of greater damage
awards and the relative ease with which a client can obtain attor-
ney-client documents. Alternatively, issuers may decide simply
not to use the attorney's services in the future, an effective deter-
rent in the competitive legal market. The deterrent effects of
threatened malpractice suits or the loss of business demonstrate
that the private sector is a more efficient and effective regulator of
attorney conduct, at least in terms, of advice given relating to the
FCPA.
Recent international efforts to combat corporate bribery of
foreign officials have brought the issue of attorney regulation into
the international arena. Although it is too early to determine ex-
actly how attorney regulation will change under the various in-
ternational anti-bribery provisions- if it changes at all- the ex-
panding international economy and increased overseas investment
by multinational corporations suggest that foreign attorneys will
be retained more frequently to provide advice concerning these
provisions than at present. Attorneys will be providing their
services in numerous countries and will be subject to a variety of
bribery provisions. It will be difficult for the SEC, or enforce-
ment agencies from other countries, to sift through the multiple
bribery laws applicable to each situation and to assert jurisdiction
outside of their respective countries. The private sector will be
able to provide a more efficient mode of regulating attorneys.
Corporations operating across the globe will have standing to
bring malpractice suits if provided for by a country's substantive
law and will be in a position to choose whether or not to retain
new counsel for future transactions. In conclusion, the private
sector can provide comparatively more efficient and effective
regulation of attorneys whose advice leads to foreign bribery and
will receive deference from governmental entities that are assigned
the task of enforcing the underlying anti-bribery provisions.
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